What ARE they doing? Part Three

Photograph from Government of Canada, http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/sudan-soudan/assets/images/10-03-10.jpg.

I’d like to start this entry by apologising for the long hiatus in my blog entries. This was partly due to the fact that I spent the month of July doing research in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, which was fascinating, difficult, and above all, time-consuming!

I’m now back and would like to pick up where I left off, which is with looking at security, the third and final pillar in Canada’s three-pronged strategy towards Sudan (the other pillars are aid and diplomacy). Here I return to the Canadian government’s website on Sudan – which, just to remind you, can be found at http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/sudan-soudan/index.aspx. According to this site, Canada is a contributor to both of the UN peacekeeping operations in Sudan: the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS). The government reports that “in addition to diplomatic, financial and material support, Canada has committed up to 50 Canadian Forces personnel and 25 civilian police officers to these peacekeeping operations in Sudan.”

The website explains that “Canada provides, on a voluntary basis, training and equipment for African countries deploying civilian police, military and Formed Police Units (FPUs) to UNAMID” – the example given is Canada’s provision of GILA armoured vehicles and non-armoured equipment to four African FPUs taking part in UNAMID: two units from Senegal, one from Burkina Faso, and one from Uganda. Apparently Canada also funds training “to help prepare peacekeeping personnel and units deploying to UNAMID,” part of which was carried out by the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, but concrete details of this training are not provided on the site.

Operation Saturn, the website tells us, refers to the deployment of “Canadian Forces personnel...to UNAMID to provide needed expertise.” Task Force Darfur is the name given to Canada’s UNAMID contingent, which is commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Ken Moore and is headquartered at El Fasher. The contingent has seven members of personnel: three logistics experts working at the headquarters of UNAMID, and four soldiers who train UNAMID troops in the operation of Grizzly and Husky AVGPs (which stands for ‘armoured vehicles, general purpose’) lent to the mission by the Canadian government.

Finally, Canada is currently the co-chair (with the US) of the “Friends of UNAMID,” a group made up of UN member states with an interest in the mission, as well as UN personnel. According to the website, this group meets regularly “to facilitate the swift and full deployment of UNAMID and coordinate donor support for the mission.”
Previous to Canadian support to UNAMID, Canada also supported the old African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) – the precursor to UNAMID – from 2004 to 2007. The website states that Canada was “one of the most important donors to AMIS,” providing “essential airlift and ground transportation, as well as targeted expert deployments of civilian police and Canadian Forces personnel to the mission” within the framework of Operation Augural.

Operation Augural, as Canada’s military involvement with AMIS, had the aim of building “capacity in the areas of strategic planning, air operations, contracting, logistics and operations planning, and land operations with the Canadian “armoured vehicle, general purpose”, or AVGP.” Canada began supporting the mission in 2004, contributing “basic army equipment, including helmets, body armour, and maps,” totalling over 104 million dollars. Then, in 2005, the Canadian government lent 105 AVGPs, to Senegal, Rwanda, and Nigeria, three troop-contributing countries. As mentioned above, this loan was later extended to UNAMID for a three-year period from 31 December 2007 to 30 June 2009 under the auspices of Operation Saturn). Finally, the website refers to “[a]viation assistance provided by Canadian contracted helicopters to AMIS,” particularly during the transition from AMIS to the UNAMID mission. Canada’s mission of support to AMIS was named Task Force Addis Ababa., made up of 11 members of the Canadian Forces. This included five working in mission support, as well as with the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF) in Addis Ababa, two working on contracts and logistics in Khartoum, and four based in El Fashir in Darfur, providing “logistics support” and training Nigerian, Rwandan, and Senegalese troops in the use of the AVGPs.

Finally, Canada also supports the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in the Sudan, or UNMIS, through Operation Safari, which is “the military component of the Canadian whole-of-government engagement in southern Sudan.” This refers to the deployment of members of the Canadian Forces, as well as civilian police officers, who have been deployed to Sudan’s southern region “as peacekeepers and military observers.” The contingent of Canadian Forces personnel, Task Force Sudan, includes 30 members. 20 of these act as United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs) across southern Sudan; another eight are staff members at UNMIS Headquarters in the Sudanese capital; and another two are with the “Canadian support element in Khartoum.”

UNAMID’s ongoing shortfall is well-known – particularly in terms of troops and helicopters – but could Canada do more than what it is already doing? In terms of troops, it is certainly falling woefully short, with no more than 50 Canadian Armed Forces personnel committed throughout the different peacekeeping missions that have been established for Sudan. What of helicopters and other essential equipment for the mission – can Canada be doing more than it is? According to the website itself, other than the “GILA armoured vehicles and non-armoured equipment” that Canada is providing to UNAMID, it appears that much-needed helicopters have not been a part of what Canada has able to provide, or willing to press other countries to provide. What is the reason for this? What is Canada currently doing as co-chair of the Friends of UNAMID? Watch this space... Continue reading this article...

Stand in the Summer

Guest Post by Anne Wagner, Principal Director

It's a Thursday in August - I would surmise that the majority of young Canadians, and our Stand members, are trying to make the most of their summers today, be it by working to earn money to get through the year, relaxing with friends and family while they can, traveling to see the world...all things we need to do rejuvenate ourselves and keep ourselves sane and functioning throughout the next year.

Summer is a relatively quiet time for Stand, at least outwardly so. We don't put on major events, our chapters aren't making splashes in the local and national news, our members aren't hosting and speaking at rallies...but the organization hums along quietly and with building momentum in the background. Summer is the time when here at National we take a step back and review our year, to try to gauge the impact of what we have done, and plan for the upcoming year. We toss around ideas, formulate plans and agree on a vision.

But that vision needs to be shared by all of Stand, which is why we hold a National conference, where we invite our members from all of our teams and chapters to attend and plan and learn to advocate even better together. This year we're changing our pattern - we used to have our conference in May so that we could have meetings with Members of Parliament in Ottawa before the House of Commons rose for the summer. This year, we will be having our conference in very early October to strengthen our chapters and team at the beginning of the year, once they have recruited new members. And this year, our action item won't focus on advocacy meetings, it will focus on activism in another context and on the focus for the year - growth. Now is the time to focus on growing the grassroots support for the anti-genocide movement, to give strength to our policy recommendations. Our conference will have a large component focusing on growth, and on capturing the attention of your community and new supporters. Check back at www.standcanada.org and here for further details about conference applications in the coming weeks.

I used to feel like we weren't doing enough in the summers, that I personally could have been doing more that would tangibly make a difference for the people of Darfur. But I've come to realize that the work of planning, of getting ourselves organized, inspired and pulling in the same direction, actually elicits better results in the long run. We are able to execute bigger campaigns, have stronger teams and see more impact and change when we take a step back over the summer and figure out our next moves. So Standers, enjoy your summers, take a break and rejuvenate, and spend a little time planning your next move. We'll speak to you in a few weeks.

Continue reading this article...

Point of Resistance

In recent years cash-strapped media services have closed foreign bureaus around the world and dropped foreign correspondents from their permanent payrolls. Inevitably, the quality of journalism has declined, with correspondents reporting from distant cities or traveling abroad only when a promising story develops (called ‘parachute journalists,’ they often lack the regional expertise necessary for effective reporting). The trend towards lean coverage is worrying, with reporters failing to convey the many ambiguities that make conflicts so difficult to resolve. Worse, with such diminished numbers of correspondents in the field, the public no longer benefits from the “diversity [of opinions and analysis] and competition” that once defined foreign correspondence. Darfur itself has been effortlessly described as an ethnic struggle between identifiable aggressors and victims, invaders and invaded, foreigners and natives. This frame is sufficiently concise to satisfy the lean editorial standards of the ‘wire,’ but not the kind of image Darfur needs to establish a lasting peace.

Of course, so long as media consumers show no appetite for more comprehensive and time-consuming analysis, media outlets will not bother to front the money necessary to provide it. But in a world where global problems demand global solutions, where even the distant conflict in Sudan is only days away by plane, reliable and accurate journalism must be joined with an attentive public. Without a committed public, the thinning ranks of foreign correspondents have little choice but to rewrite Darfur in sensationalist frames. These frames offer nothing to the conflict’s resolution but are vastly more user friendly, that is, they pack a lot of excitement and emotion in a very small package.

The power to reverse media’s march towards bare-bones sensationalism lies in the internet, both in its ability to globalize local political issues and to redefine the functions of more traditional mediums such as newspapers. More detailed and problematic coverage has already appeared among some major publications, owing largely to the growing dominance of internet news feeds. The Wall Street Journal, for example, is “shifting the coverage of breaking news to its website, while directing longer, in-depth stories to the print newspaper.” The Los Angeles Times has announced similar plans for its web and paper publications, while the Globe and Mail may adopt the new format in 2010. If media users take advantage of the more comprehensive coverage offered in the remodeled newspapers, the quality of journalism may very well improve.

However, because media providers are owned and operated by business moguls with implicit political agendas and the power to label people and actors, major news providers are never entirely dependable. While Western citizens were shocked by the violent British response to the Irish Troubles of the 1980’s, particularly the events of Bloody Sunday, journalists and editors insisted on describing the warring factions as mindless religious extremists and the British military as benevolent but hapless peacekeepers. Alternatives to mainstream media are readily available online, and in Darfur radio broadcasters have used the web to relay their local programming across the world. A new point of resistance (this time a badly needed pacifist one) has emerged in Darfur’s Radio Dabanga. Established by the Project of the Radio Darfur Network –a coalition of non-governmental organizations, Sudanese journalists and international sponsors- the new station employs fifty correspondents covering Darfur and provides news in three, soon to be four, local languages. English transcripts of broadcasts are posted on the station’s website.

More broadly, the entire Sudanese press is vibrant and relatively free of dissident persecution, while also available in English. Op-ed pieces, columns, editorials and letters on Darfur make frequent appearances in Sudanese papers, while six papers maintain their own correspondents in Darfur. Sudanese journalists have the advantage of being Sudanese and understanding the culture and politics of their own country in a way parachute correspondents rarely can.

The benefits of local journalism are obvious, with plenty of critical coverage of issues often ignored by Western media (such as the atrocities committed by Darfur rebel groups). In addition, by utilizing the Sudanese press international media providers can supplement their meager presence on the ground. Finally, if media audiences are more willing to learn about the complex realities of a conflict by following local coverage, correspondents may respond with more nuanced coverage of their own.

johnmatchim84@gmail.com

Radio Dabanga: http://www.radiodabanga.org/

Muhammad Idrees Ahmad, “The Darfur Deception,” http://dissidentvoice.org/2009/06/the-darfur-deception/

John Hughes, “US media can’t cover the news if they don’t cover the world,” Christian Science Monitor, http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0207/p09s01-cojh.html

Fred Hiatt. “The Vanishing Correspondent,” http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/vp01.cfm?outfit=pmt&folder=193&paper=2770 Continue reading this article...

Sudan's World Bank Woes

Activists must oppose the imposition of structural readjustment policies and neoliberalism in general, which have generally impoverishing effects on the targeted country’s population, and serve to further concentrate wealth and power in the hands of a small elite sector of society (Fake and Funk, 2009: 125).
While Sudan divestment campaigns have enjoyed sympathy and success across the United States and Canada, two core institutions of First World economic power remain active in Khartoum: the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Since their inception following the Second World War, the IMF and World Bank have promoted free market values around the world, offering substantial loans to developing nations and encouraging the formation of vibrant capitalist markets with minimum state intervention. However, when a recipient nation defaults on its loan, harsh social and economic policies are imposed. As we will see, those policies have been decisive instruments of environmental degradation, starvation and ineffectual governance in Sudan. For these reasons, Steven Fake and Kevin Funk suggest that advocates must seriously consider encouraging action against the IMF and World Bank.
As a ‘reward’ for lending Arab support to the 1978 Egyptian-Israeli Camp David peace agreement, Sudan was loaned billions of dollars in development aid by the IMF and World Bank. However, the money “quickly vanished in the corruption ridden government and Western expatriate aid administrators, leaving Sudan with a debt equivalent to its entire GDP.” In response, the IMF ordered a slashing of the state budget and privatization of government services and corporations. The IMF and World Bank also encouraged the continued development of an export-based economy (particularly agricultural products).
These policies have damaged Sudan in the recent past and threaten further harm in the future. With cutbacks and privatization, the quality of public services (such as schools and hospitals) inevitably declined, while national wealth has been absorbed by Sudan’s upper classes. Equally troublesome are the potential consequences of low oil prices or disrupted production. As Fake and Funk demonstrate, privatization reduces the opportunity for government patronage -often the only way for weak national authorities to buy off dissenters- leaving foreign investors to seek protection from a black market economy of violence. While the discovery of oil has buttressed the Sudanese government and averted (for now) an authority meltdown, any long-term decline in prices or disrupted production could expose the Sudanese government to dissenting forces. Because Darfur is challenged by desertification, lawlessness and a communications disconnect with Khartoum, a lasting peace for the region depends largely on a strong and responsive Sudanese central government. Unfortunately, even a stable government under IMF sponsorship may feel more accountable to the concerns of its “external backers” than those of its domestic constituents.
The IMF’s agricultural policies have also negatively affected Darfur. Traditional agricultural practices throughout Sudan emphasized the preservation of bush and forest fallow (for animal protein, timber and private crop production), and smaller scale production that left adequate reserves for personal consumption and did not depend on experimental hybrids. Under IMF encouragement, however, hundreds of thousands of acres were clearcut, “reducing humidity and cloud formation and increasing soil salinity.” Famines became more frequent throughout Sudan and the climate dryer, forcing farmers to open up new lands. Despite the surge in oil prices and production, agriculture remains a valuable export industry for Sudan. Now, with IMF approval, foreign companies are buying up huge tracts of Sudanese land, securing new food supplies as global agricultural output falls behind rampant population growth. To date, South Korea and the United Arab Emirates have purchased a combined total of 720,000 hectares, with another 378,000 in development. Unfortunately for the people of Darfur they will see none of that food anytime soon.
A new approach to Sudanese aid should be crafted, one that does not force the dismantling of state machinery and plants the interest of Sudanese people (including Darfurians) firmly before those of international creditors. The consequences of failure are already evident today, and under current regime no aid is better than IMF aid.

Gwynne Dyer, “African Land Grab”
http://www.gwynnedyer.com/articles/Gwynne%20Dyer%20article_%20%20Afric
an%20Land%20Grab.txt

Joseph Winter, “Khartoum booms as Darfur burns”
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6573527.stm

Steven Fake and Kevin Funk, “The Scramble for Africa: Darfur- Intervention and the
USA,” (Montreal; New York; London: Black Rose Books, 2009). (particularly
pages 28-30)

Jay O’Brien, “Sowing the seeds of famine: the political economy of food deficits in
Sudan” in World Recession and the Food Crisis in Africa ed. Peter Lawrence,
(London: Review of African Political Economy, 1986).

See also IMF and World Bank websites.

John R. Matchim Continue reading this article...

With charming ease, three young activists 'be the change'

Hello Standers!

I want to share a story with you posted by The Globe and Mail (below) about three extraordinary high school students that are making a world of difference for our cause, and making it easy to act against genocide.

A few months ago, Hannah Clifford, Daisy King, and Sarah Byres, three students from Northern Secondary School in Toronto, contacted me about a planning a benefit concert to raise awareness for the victims of the genocide in Darfur; a cause that we all have tirelessly championed.

I was struck immediately by their passion, enthousiasm, and dedication to making a difference for the people of Darfur - to being 'the change' they wished to see in the world.

This passion to 'be the change' drove the three girls to accomplish some extraordinary things in planning this event. The girls, mostly themselves, but with a little help from supportive parents, managed to receive sponsorships, book a live venue, build an event website, and most impressively, attract The City's 'Tamarama' and some local T.O. rock bands to perform at the concert. Like the Globe and Mail Article says, "As though organizing a benefit concert ain't no thing."

I can truly say that working with Hannah, Daisy, and Sara has been an incredible privilege and an inspiration. At every turn, through every bump in the road, the three girls have exemplified young leadership, determination, and kindness, and have made one thing very clear: You can make a difference at any age.

And so, I urge all of you that can, especially those in the GTA, to turn out to the Berkely Church and Event Centre (315 Queen St. E) this Tuesday, June 2nd at 6:30 PM, for what promises to be an incredible event organized by three extraodinary young activists.

Tickets are $25 at the door, but can also be purchased online at http://web.me.com/darfur/DARFUR/Home.html, or through the Stand website for $20.

Consider this event one of the easiest (and fun) ways you can act against genocide!

Cheers,
The Dreamer
Evan Cinq-Mars

---------------------
Globe and Mail Article
"With charming ease, three young activists 'be the change'
May 30, 2009

Last week, three teenage girls from Northern Secondary School ended up channelling Gandhi. They were trying to come up with a name for their upcoming benefit concert and finally settled on the name “Darfur: Be the Change” – an unwitting reference to the maxim “you must be the change you wish to see in the world.”

“It was a nice coincidence,” said Daisy Kling, Hannah Clifford and Sara Byres in a collective e-mail. “His meaning behind the quote is so in sync with what the three of us are trying to accomplish.”

This trio of 11th graders are hoping that their musical fundraiser will raise awareness – and money – for the victims of the genocide in Darfur. On June 2 at the Berkeley Church, local bands The Cheap Kicks and Birds of Whales will appear along with guest speaker Debbie Bodkin, formerly of the United Nations in Darfur. Most notably, perhaps, the tenacious teens secured Tamarama, a folk-rock duo from Australia, famed for their recent appearance on MTV's The City .

“We contacted them through MySpace and then were directed to their booking agent,” said the girls, as though they've been booking famous headliners for years.

They're part of a generation that approaches activism with a charming ease. They came of age with Craig Kielberger, the now famous activist from Thornhill who founded Free The Children at the age of 12. Like Daisy, Hannah and Sara, he read something that didn't sit well with him and responded with action, perhaps a novel concept to older (or lazier) individuals.

Consider the 100 students camping out all night at Queen's Park (in the rain) last month, raising awareness for child soldiers. Or the week-long conference for young activists earlier this month, organized by Toronto's Youth Action Network.

Daisy, Hannah and Sara name Mr. Kielberger as an inspiration, but are quick to point out the real source of their motivation: the people in Darfur whom they are aiming to help. “Learning about the cause and knowing something must be done makes us determined.”

In addition to a night of great tunes, consider your $25 ticket ($20 in cash) an investment in two worthwhile causes: the aid effort in Darfur, and the gutsy activism of the next generation. “You can make a difference at any age,” they write.

As though organizing a benefit concert ain't no thing.

Proceeds will benefit the Canadian Red Cross, and STAND, a youth-based initiative promoting advocacy and activism. To purchase tickets or for more information, visit the website at www.darfurbenefitconcert.com. Special to The Globe and Mail

Continue reading this article...

What ARE they doing? Part Two

In my last blog entry, it was my aim to look at what Canada is concretely doing to take action on the situation in Darfur. I wrote about Canada’s relations with Sudan, and, drawing on the Canadian government’s website, outlined Canada’s approach to Sudan in the realm of diplomacy (one of three pillars including aid and security). I will now turn to the first of two remaining pillars, aid, looking at what the Canadian government website says it is doing to assist Sudan in this area.

Through the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Canada “provides humanitarian assistance to meet the immediate basic needs of conflict-affected populations in Sudan, mainly in the Darfur region, as well as support for the return and reintegration of millions of people displaced by the separate civil war in southern Sudan.” According to the government website, Canada has made over $143 million available in relief aid to civilians affected by war in Sudan.

Through CIDA, Canada also makes early recovery support available to underpin the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. This refers to CIDA’s support for “governance, education, health care, mine action, and reintegration of internally-displaced and refugee populations.” According to the website, since January 2006 Canada has made over $89 million available for early recovery efforts.

Finally, in addition to Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the UK, moreover, Canada is part of the Joint Donor Team, which is “mandated to assist to Government of southern Sudan to promote policies in support of sustainable peace, poverty reduction and the attainment of Millennium Development Goals.”

There is no mention on the government website about Sudan’s recent move expelling 13 foreign aid agencies from the country following the issuing of an International Criminal Court arrest warrant for Sudanese President Bashir – an act that, in my view, has tainted the rosy picture painted of Canadian involvement in Sudan. Of late, moreover, the situation for aid workers (including Canadians) has become more perilous, with several of these workers having been kidnapped in recent months. How will the Canadian government respond to the imperilling of humanitarian activity in Darfur, which will further compromise the lives of Sudanese civilians?

The briefness of this section of the website makes it seem like a dollar figure should be sufficient for Canadians to feel that we are doing our very best to help those in need of humanitarian assistance in Darfur. It isn’t enough, for these aggregate figures can disguise many realities. If you go to the link http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/sudan, there’s the good stuff, for it gives concrete figures for what has been accomplished in Sudan. These figures, however, are problematic for they do not assess CIDA’s specific contribution, only the global results that CIDA has contributed to along with other donors. A useful resource may be the Mid Term Evaluation carried out by the Joint Donor Team in February 2009, which is available at http://www.norad.no/items/14798/38/4592453832/Mid-Term%20Evaluation%20of%20the%20Joint%20Donor%20Team%20in%20Juba,%20Sudan.pdf.

In my next blog entry: I will look at the last element in Canada’s three-pronged approach to Sudan, security. As always, I invite your comments and suggestions!

-Sarah Katz-Lavigne Continue reading this article...

Armed Humanitarianism: Can it work in Darfur?

This entry will examine military intervention (not including the No-Fly Zone, which was discussed previously) and its applicability to Dafur. I wish to emphasize my belief that Darfur is a conflict that will require international attention for years or even decades after the actual cessation of hostilities. Without long-term efforts to promote reconstruction and reconciliation of the Darfur provinces, the causes of the conflict will only fester and find expression through renewed violence in the not so distant future. We therefore need to consider policies that extend well into the future, while also considering the long-term ramifications of policies designed to immediately address the conflict. A military solution to the conflict, while not widely discussed at present, should nevertheless be seriously contemplated –both for its potential to end the conflict, and also to destabilize Darfur and Sudan for years or decades to come.
At its most basic, armed humanitarian intervention is the use of threat of military force to coerce an aggressor into respecting basic human rights. Usually, the violating power has not attacked any external enemies, nor has it challenged in any way those nations threatening its capacity of wage war. In principle, the lone justification for military action is empathy for the victims of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide (though in practice, the motives for humanitarian intervention are often grounded in more traditional geo-political considerations).
In Sudan today the United Nations and African Union are slowly deploying a 26,000 personnel peacekeeping force to the provinces of Darfur. With so few troops (Darfur is roughly the size of France), limited logistical and transport support, and a weak mandate, UNAMID has been unable to effectively monitor the entire region, while it is also vulnerable to attack by rebels, government forces and bandits. It therefore seems natural to consider a more forceful mandate or perhaps something more aggressive, such as a NATO-led intervention, as the obvious solution. Afterall, external military power has been applied to Sierra Leone, Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia and East Timor, among other places, so why not Darfur as well? As will be outlined below, there are a number of problems regarding the use of military power to resolve conflicts, while it would also damage any prospects of establishing a permanent peace in the near future.
Short-term considerations leading to military interventions, without adequate situational understanding and driven only by a sense of urgency, can unleash a range of unanticipated developments. A most basic but serious problem is the inability of modern militaries to manage humanitarian tasks. As Gwynne Dyer observed in his book War, Western military powers (those capable of launching humanitarian interventions) are trained and equipped to fulfill a doctrine of decisive victory, achieved by the unrelenting application of superior firepower (witness the ‘Shock and Awe’ bombing of Baghdad). Western forces have so far failed to adjust to the post-Cold War developments of humanitarian warfare, operations that require patience, restraint and a thorough understanding of regional culture, society, language, history and political system. Lacking the necessary training, background and expertise, soldiers and commanders can make insensitive decisions based on fear and frustration, slowly but surely fuelling resentment and building resistance against them.
Resentment and resistance can fester in other ways as well, as veteran Canadian war correspondent Paul Watson observed many time over the last two decades. For example, in Somalia Watson argued that powerful warlords perceived intervention as an attempt to deny them their rightful inheritance of the government, while in Kosovo he witnessed fighters of the Kosovo Liberation Amy attacking Serbian forces and civilians under the umbrella of NATO airpower. For these reasons Alton Frey, an analyst for the Council on Foreign Relations, warned that the short-term deployment of military forces “can make little or no contribution to mitigating the conditions that led to the atrocities.”
The use of military power in Darfur today (either a better mandated United Nations, or another country or organization) would explicitly claim the Darfur provinces as protectorates of the international community, while branding Sudan the enemy of peace and justice. Considering that political dialogue (or lack thereof) was a significant cause of the current conflict, the editors of Explaining Darfur argue that armed intervention could have very serious repercussions for the foreseeable future.
What do you think? Has Darfur passed beyond the point of no return? Has the time finally and truly arrived to risk the perils of more aggressive humanitarian intervention?

See these books for information on armed humanitarianism and its discontents.

Frye, Alton. Humanitarian Intervention: Crafting a Workable Doctrine. New York:
Council on Foreign Relations, 2000. (particularly pages 1-20)

Dyer, Gwynne. War. Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2005. (see chapter on guerilla warfare)

Watson, Paul. Where War Lives. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2007.

van Ardenne, Agnes, Mohamed Salih, Grono, Nick and Mendez, Juan. Explaining
Darfur. Amsterdam: Vossiuspers UvA, 2006.

John R. Matchim Continue reading this article...